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Students are the best thing about teaching!















A little bit of Bentham.
Who may impeach?
Impeaching a witness’s character for
truthfulness.
Using prior inconsistent statements.
Bias.
Incapacity.
Specific Contradiction/Collateral Evidence
Rehabilitation
Impeachment by conviction

"[T]he system, taken in the aggregate, is
repugnant to the ends of justice; and . . . this
is true of almost every rule that has ever been
laid down on the subject of evidence."
Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence (1827).



to ensure that the trial is fair



to ensure that the trial is accurate



to ensure that the trial is efficient





to ensure that societal interests are
vindicated
Jeremy Bentham?



To make money for “Judge & Company”!








1) Dishonesty (the witness is dishonest!)
2) Inconsistency (self-contradiction)
3) Bias
4) Incapacity (you couldn’t see; you were
under the influence)
5) Specific contradiction (She says it was
snowing that day – but it wasn’t! We
shouldn’t trust anything she says!)



THE STARTING POINT: THE GENERAL BAN ON
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN RULE 11-404

11-404(A). Character evidence.
(1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of a person’s
character or character trait is not admissible
to prove that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character
or trait.

(3) Exceptions for a witness. Evidence of a
witness’s character may be admitted under
Rules 11-607, 11-608, and 11-609 NMRA.

“It is remarkable that a set of assumptions so
far from the lessons of experience could
support a fully developed and widely
observed structure of litigation law.”
What is Professor Uviller talking about?





Character evidence of witness truthfulness
(which can come in) is somehow more
predictive than character for thievery or
violence (which generally cannot be
admitted)?
Do you agree?

Any party, including the party that called the
witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.
BUT what?
ANY LIMIT ON THAT?





A party cannot call a witness solely for the
purpose of impeaching the witness.
Why not?



That would be back-dooring hearsay!



EXAMPLE:








DV victim recants at trial; impeached with grand jury
testimony.
Subsequently, the court orders a mistrial.
Next trial, the prosecution calls DV victim again.
THIS TIME: SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF
BACKDOORING IN HER GRAND JURY STATEMENT.
NOT PERMITTED!







How do you tell when a party is doing that?
Lopez: Is the testimony mostly “favorable” or
“unfavorable”?
If the DV victim is solely recanting, it is
UNFAVORABLE to the State, and he or she is
only being called to be impeached.








Favorable: does it go to the substance of the
matter in controversy (in Lopez, who killed
the victim)?
Unfavorable: is it “affirmatively harmful” to
the proponent of the witness’s testimony?
So long as it’s both, the witness can be
impeached on a matter, if necessary.
But not if it is SOLELY UNFAVORABLE
testimony to the proponent.

(A) Reputation or opinion evidence.
A witness’s credibility may be attacked or
supported by testimony about the witness’s
reputation for having a character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of
an opinion about that character.
But evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the witness’s character for
untruthfulness has been attacked . . . .







Preference: opinion or reputation as to
truthfulness.
Must be an attack on witness’s truthfulness
before a litigant can support the witness’s
character for truth.
Otherwise: wasteful bolstering!





Don’t forget: PARTIES can be witnesses!
The rule applies the same way to all testifying
witnesses.








Medical malpractice case.
Plaintiff’s expert testified that it was a
botched surgery.
Defense calls an attorney who says the expert
has a reputation for dishonesty.
PROPER! Under Rule 608, the expert could be
impeached by testimony that he had a
reputation for dishonesty.

(B) Specific instances of conduct. Except for a
criminal conviction under Rule 11-609 NMRA,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove
specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order
to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if
they are probative of the character for
truthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness
being cross-examined has testified about.
....







A witness who happens to be a lawyer
testifies in a murder case.
Cross: “Isn’t it true that you lied on your
application to the bar!?” [INTRINSIC]
If the witness denies it, can the bar
application be admitted to impeach?
[EXTRINSIC]





ONLY INTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS PERMITTED:
YOU CAN ASK BUT YOU ARE STUCK WITH THE
ANSWER.
WHY?





Avoiding a side trial on the witness’s
character for truthfulness.
Mini-trials on collateral issues . . . .

[18]
 Civil suit arising out of a real estate
transaction.
 The plaintiff has testified (a pre-requisite!).
 The defendant presents a witness to testify
that the plaintiff has a bad reputation for
truthfulness.
 The defense witness is now on the stand.
FIRST OBJECTION. YOU ARE THE JUDGE [YOU
REALLY ARE!].
WHAT IS YOUR RULING?



A) OBJECTION SUSTAINED!



B) OBJECTION OVERRULED!

Only the reputation for truthfulness is allowed.
“TERRIBLE” is not clearly aimed at truthfulness.
ROLL THE VIDEOTAPE!
NEXT OBJECTION!
YOU ARE THE JUDGE!



A) OBJECTION SUSTAINED!



B) OBJECTION OVERRULED!





That’s proper. But sloppy explanation by
defense for why it is OK.
WATCH AND JUDGE!



“The right of a party in a civil case to call a
witness who can testify concerning the
reputation of one of the parties for
truthfulness and veracity.”

Three technical errors? What are they?

1) Applies to witnesses in both civil and
criminal cases.
2) You can impeach all witnesses, not just a
party.
3) You can’t impeach all parties, just
WITNESSES.



“Based on what you know of the plaintiff’s
reputation, would you believe him under
oath?”



Fair question?



(You don’t have to click every time!)





ACN to Fed. R. Evid. 608: “under modern
practice, a common relaxation has allowed
inquiry as to whether the witnesses would
believe the principal witness under oath.”
But, it’s cumulative, as the judge points out.



Can plaintiff’s counsel now call a witness to
rehabilitate the plaintiff’s character for
truthfulness?

In what manner may that witness testify?

(A) Reputation or opinion evidence.
A witness’s credibility may be attacked or
supported by testimony about the witness’s
reputation for having a character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by
testimony in the form of an opinion about
that character.
....



YOUR PROBLEM HOST!










Plaintiff lawyer in a race discrimination case
testifies.
Claims his law firm terminated him because of
his race.
Can defense counsel ask the plaintiff whether he
has outstanding parking tickets (minor civil fine)?
CLICKERS:
A) YES
B) NO



NO! Not probative of truthfulness.

PROBLEM:
 What if defense counsel asks the plaintiff
about stating that he had no outstanding
parking tickets on his bar application when
he in fact had several at the time?

YES! Probative of untruthfulness. Defense
counsel may ask.
But if the witness denies it?
BUT WHAT ARE THE LIMITS UNDER 11-608(B)?








May not be proved with extrinsic evidence.
Defense counsel is STUCK WITH THE ANSWER!
ALSO, the question is subject to a GOOD
FAITH requirement.
As well as 11-403.

(B) Specific instances of conduct. Except for a
criminal conviction under Rule 11-609 NMRA,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove
specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order
to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if
they are probative of the character for
truthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness
being cross-examined has testified about.
....







PROBLEM:
In response to the question about the bar
application (“Did you lie on it?”), the plaintiff
testified that he had told no such lie.
Can defense counsel call a witness to prove
the lawyer lied on his bar application?

NO! Same issue!


11-608(B) bars extrinsic evidence of specific
instances of conduct offered to attack and
support a witness’s character for
truthfulness.









Defendant in a tax fraud case testifies in her
own defense.
Can the government ask her on cross
examination about a deceptive resume she
sent to a prospective employer?
CLICKERS:
A) YES
B) NO





Counsel can ask, but is stuck with her
answer. They cannot admit the resume if she
denies it.
No extrinsic evidence of a specific act of
dishonesty!











Defendant charged with bank robbery.
Alibi witness: “Defendant did not rob the
bank! We were having lunch at that time!”
On cross, the prosecution asks: “Aren’t you in
business with defendant’s father?”
Alibi witness: “YES.”
Can Defendant now call a witness to say the
alibi witness’s reputation for truthfulness is
good?
CLICKER: A) Yes B) No





No. The State questioned the witness’s bias,
not character for truthfulness.
11-608: “. . . evidence of truthful character
is admissible only after the witness’s
character for untruthfulness has been
attacked.”



Prosecutor to alibi witness: “Didn’t you lie on
a bank loan application?”

Alibi witness: “Yes.”


Can Defendant call a witness to testify that
the alibi witness’s reputation for truthfulness
is good?

Yes!


Now the witness’s character for
untruthfulness has been attacked.










Alibi witness testifies for Defendant in a criminal
case.
Prosecutor submits evidence of Alibi witness’s prior
felony under Rule 11-609.
Defendant calls a neighbor to testify that the alibi
witness, in his opinion, is a truthful person.
So far, so good.
When cross-examining the neighbor, can the
prosecutor ask if the neighbor knew that the Alibi
witness lied on her bank loan app?

(B) Specific instances of conduct. Except for a criminal
conviction under Rule 11-609 NMRA, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances
of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support
the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court
may, on cross-examination, allow them to be
inquired into if they are probative of the character for
truthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character
the witness being cross-examined
has testified about.
....







1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Dishonesty (the witness is dishonest)
Inconsistency (self-contradiction)
Bias
Incapacity
Specific contradiction





HOW TO DO BASIC DEPOSITION
IMPEACHMENT.
THE THREE Cs!







COMMIT the witness to their current
testimony.
CREDIT the prior statement.
CONFRONT the witness with the prior
statement.





WHAT COLOR WAS THE LIGHT, FOR CRYING
OUT LOUD?
WATCH THE ACTION!!!



TWO PRIMARY RULES AT PLAY REGARDING
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.



11-801(D)(1)(a)



11-613

(D) Statements that are not hearsay. A statement
that meets the following conditions is not
hearsay:
(1) A declarant-witness’s prior statement.
The declarant testifies and
is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement,
and the statement:
(a) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony
and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition
....



They can be admitted for the truth of the
matter asserted.



They are “not hearsay” by definition.



BAHA! (WWJBS?)

....
B. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement.
Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior
inconsistent statement is admissible only if
the witness is given an opportunity to explain or
deny the statement and
an adverse party is given an opportunity to
examine the witness about it, or
• if justice so requires.
This paragraph does not apply to an opposing
party’s statement under Rule 11-801(D)(2)
NMRA. [STATEMENTS OF AN OPPOSING PARTY].

B. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement. Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s
prior inconsistent statement is admissible
only if
the witness is given an opportunity to explain
or deny the statement . . . .


Does not have to be immediately, so long as
the witness can be recalled to confront it.



Remember – prior inconsistent statements that
do not meet the requirements of 11-801(D)(1)(a)
may still be offered to undermine the witness’s
credibility!



NOT for the truth of the matter asserted.



NOT as substantive evidence.





Solely to show that the witness has said two
different things at one time.
UPON REQUEST: Limiting instruction! (Shudder)






“[I SAY TO YOU:] The testimony of a witness
may be impeached by showing that he
previously made statements which are
inconsistent with his present testimony. The
earlier contradictory statements are
admissible only to impeach the credibility of
the witness, and not to establish the truth of
those statements . . . .”
What’s the practical problem?
Why do I “shudder”?





Might be important at directed verdict stage.
If the statement was offered for impeachment
only and did not meet 11-801(D)(1)(a), then
it’s NOT substantive evidence that can be
considered.



Wendy testifies before a grand jury that Dan
told her he set a fire.
At the arson trial: Wendy denies ever hearing
Dan admit to setting the fire.
Prosecution asks her if she told the grand
jury that.
She denies have done so.



Can they introduce the grand jury testimony?











Sure. Under 11-801(d)(1)(A) and 11-613.
Assuming that they use it with her on the
stand or that Wendy can be recalled to be
given an opportunity to explain or deny.









Wendy signs an unsworn statement to a
detective that Dan told her he set the fire.
At the arson trial: Wendy denies ever hearing
Dan admit to setting the fire.
Prosecution asks her if she told the detective
that.
She denies have done so.
Can they impeach her with the unsworn
statement?
CLICKERS: A) YES B) NO







Sure, it’s not under 11-801(D)(1)(a), but if
11-613 requirements are met, it’s admissible
to impeach Wendy’s credibility, but NOT as
substantive evidence.
And if that were the ONLY evidence that Dan
committed arson?
NO substantive evidence; directed verdict
granted after prosecution rests.








1) Dishonesty (the witness is dishonest)
2) Inconsistency (self-contradiction)
3) Bias
4) Incapacity (witness couldn’t see; under the
influence; etc.)
5) Specific contradiction





Young Mr. Lincoln!
HENRY FONDA IS A BETTER ACTOR THAN
DANIEL DAY-LEWIS! [There, I said it!]



Said another way, can extrinsic evidence be
permitted to impeach in this instance?



CLICKERS:



A) YES



B) NO



He claimed he could see, when he couldn’t
see!





They can only be inquired about.
NOTE: They are permitted under 11-609
(criminal convictions).



There is no rule that governs such evidence
except rules of relevance, particularly Rule
11-403.








Bias can include (but is not limited to):
a
a
a
a

witness’s
witness’s
witness’s
witness’s

preference for a party;
dislike for a party;
fear of a party; or
self-interest.









Witness Mills – testified helpfully for the
Defendant.
Prosecution asked if he and the Defendant
belonged to a secret organization whose
members were supposed to lie, cheat and steal
for each other.
Mills denies membership.
Prosecution puts their witness, Ehle, back on to
contradict that.
Defense objects!
What are the two possible avenues of
admissibility?

1) Specific instance of conduct (membership in
the organization that lies) under 11-608(B)
that was probative of truthfulness.
What’s the 11-608(B) roadblock?

(B) Specific instances of conduct. Except for a
criminal conviction under Rule 11-609, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove specific
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to
attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if
they are probative of the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness
being cross-examined has testified about.
....

Witness Mills denies membership in the org.


Why can the prosecutor use extrinsic
evidence (through Witness Ehle) to prove the
membership?





BIAS! He and defendant were both members
of the same club!
Bias has no limitations on the introduction of
extrinsic evidence.







No extrinsic evidence of specific acts to show
character for untruthfulness under 11-608(B).
But extrinsic evidence is permitted to prove
BIAS.
WHY THE DIFFERENCE?



No mini-trials on dishonest witnesses?



But bias might mean more? Mini-trials OK?



[Internal inconsistency in the rules? NAAAAH!]



WWJBS?







Plaintiff Patsy sued Dirksen after a car
accident.
At trial, Wrigley, a passenger in Defendant
Dirksen’s car at the time of the accident,
testified on behalf of Dirksen.
Wrigley testified it was red. (Plaintiff Patsy
contended that it was green.)
On cross-examination of Wrigley, the
following exchanged occurred.

Plaintiff’s counsel: “Mr. Wrigley, isn’t it a fact that
you lied on your application for a state
contractor’s license when you claimed to be
bonded?”
Witness: “No, I didn’t lie.”
Plaintiff’s counsel: “Isn’t it true that you want to
work for Defendant Dirksen and that you have an
application for employment pending with him?”
Witness: “No, that’s not true.”

Plaintiff Patsy possesses:
(i) a copy of Wrigley’s application for a
contractor’s license in which Wrigley falsely
claimed to be bonded, and
(ii) a copy of Wrigley’s employment
application with Dirksen’s company.
Is it possible for Patsy to complete the
impeachment of Wrigley by using either piece
of evidence?









A) Just with (i) the application for
contractor’s license.
B) Just with (ii) the employment app.
C) Both (i) and (ii).
D) Neither (i) nor (ii).
E) George, I’m tired and marshmallows are
my favorite food.





The employment application: Extrinsic
evidence to show bias is permitted.
The lie on the contractor’s license
application: extrinsic evidence prohibited by
11-608(B) to show character for truthfulness.



Extrinsic evidence is also permitted.



Largely an 11-403 analysis.



What’s the probative value?



Risk of unfair prejudice?







Witness testifies that he was on the way home
from a school meeting when he witnessed an
accident.
In fact he had been drinking in a bar all
afternoon and evening.
Is extrinsic evidence of the drinking
admissible?



Yes, because it goes to incapacity.










1) Dishonesty: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF
SPECIFIC ACTS EXCLUDED UNDER 11-608(B),
but 11-609 convictions can be admitted.
2) Inconsistency: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
PERMITTED UNLESS IT’S A COLLATERAL ISSUE.
3) Bias: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PERMITTED
4) Incapacity: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
PERMITTED
5) Specific contradiction: EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
PERMITTED UNLESS IT’S A COLLATERAL ISSUE.










Bars extrinsic evidence offered to prove a
COLLATERAL issue.
Testimony in a sexual harassment case.
Witness comments that it was snowing, which
has nothing to do with the merits.
The witness was wrong about it snowing!
IMPEACH: SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION?
How do you figure out whether something is
collateral?









Can the fact in question be proven for a
purpose other than contradicting a witness?
DOES IT MATTER IN THE CASE, OTHER THAN
TO SHOW THE WITNESS IS WRONG OR LYING?
If it’s not probative of something else in the
case, it’s COLLATERAL.
Snowing in a sexual harassment case? BAHA!









Motorcyclist sues a truck driver after an
accident.
Witness Ethan testifies he saw the accident
while waiting for a bus and that the truck was
speeding.
He had told an adjuster he was waiting for a
friend, not the bus.
Can they call the adjuster to impeach him?





No!
Collateral evidence rule bars the use of
extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statements for collateral impeachment.









If a witness is impeached with evidence of
bias, he or she can be rehabilitated with
evidence to disprove bias.
Governed only by rules of relevance (11-402,
11-403).
Same is true of incapacity.
But rehabilitation after attacks on
truthfulness must adhere to RULE 11-608!

(A) Reputation or opinion evidence.
A witness’s credibility may be attacked or
supported by testimony about the witness’s
reputation for having a character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of
an opinion about that character.
But evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the witness’s character for
untruthfulness has been attacked . . . .





Only in the form of REPUTATION or OPINION.
Only after an attack on the character for
truthfulness.







A witness who testifies as to another
witness’s reputation for untruthfulness or
that, in their opinion, the other witness is
dishonest.
Specific act inquiries on cross: “Isn’t it true
that you lied on your application to the bar?”
11-609 felony convictions or crimes of
dishonesty!








Is a prior inconsistent statement always
attacking truthfulness?
Or a specific contradiction?
Depends on the context.
It may just be a witness’s forgetfulness or
confusion, not dishonesty.





“Convenient as hard-and-fast answers to
these questions may be, it is unsound to
resolve them in a mechanical fashion.”
The judge should look at each inconsistency
or contradiction and consider whether it’s an
attack on truthfulness in that situation.



“If you wake up in camp in your sleeping bag
and a bear is examining you, USE YOUR BEST
JUDGMENT.”







Is the witness just innocently mistaken or are
they lying?
Does the inconsistency or contradiction defy
any conclusion other than the fact that it is a
lie?
How many inconsistencies? If there are a
number of them, the inference may be that
the witness is a liar!





You can only rehabilitate with evidence of
character for truthfulness AFTER a witness’s
character for truthfulness has been attacked.
And sometimes, it just isn’t clear whether
prior inconsistent statements or specific
contradictions are attacking truthfulness or
not.







Plaintiff in a med mal case calls a physician as
an expert witness.
Physician admits to being paid $5000 for her
testimony.
What kind of impeachment?





BIAS!
Can the defense call someone to testify that
the expert has a reputation for truthfulness?





NO!
Bias can be rehabilitated with evidence of
non-bias, but not truthfulness.




Shoplifting case.
Prosecution calls a store employee who testifies
that she saw the defendant cutting security tags
off in the dressing room and shoving clothes in
her bag.

On cross, defendant’s attorney asks: “So, you
have the ability to see through slats and around
corners?”
PROBLEM:
 Can the prosecution call someone to testify to
the employee’s reputation for truthfulness?










MAYBE!
Incapacity – probably not an attack on the
honesty of the witness.
Although, a solid argument could be made
that the suggestion is that the employee is
just lying.
THE POINT: the context MIGHT matter.

FIRST: 11-801(D)(1)(b)


Offered to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication or recent improper motive.

(1) A declarant-witness’s prior statement.
The declarant testifies and
is subject to cross-examination about a
prior statement,
and the statement: . . .
(b) is consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge that the
declarant recently fabricated it or acted
from a recent improper influence or motive
in so testifying;









CAR WRECK involving two cars, Mercedes and a
Ford. Drivers sue each other.
At the scene, Witness tells cops that Mercedes
was speeding.
A week before trial, Witness gets hired by driver
of Ford in a high-paying position.
At trial, lawyer for driver of Mercedes says, “You
are testifying that the Mercedes was speeding
because the driver of the Ford gave you a big
fancy job last week, isn’t that true?”
REBUTTAL:
Prior consistent statement of Witness can be
offered under 11-801(D)(1)(b).





The statement is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge that the declarant recently
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying.
Offered to rebut, not to bolster.





Can you offer prior consistent statements just
to rehabilitate and NOT for the truth of the
matter asserted?
When 11-801(D) is not an issue?










Murder case.
Prosecution witness Lucero testifies.
Defense suggests on cross that Lucero’s testimony is
inconsistent with what he told his aunt.
May prosecution offer complete statement to his
aunt, to rebut the suggestion that it was inconsistent?
Does not fit into 11-801(D)!
Are there any differences between prior consistent
statements offered to rehabilitate and those offered
for the truth of the matter asserted?







Prior consistent statements are admissible to
rehabilitate:
1) to place a supposed inconsistent statement
in context;
2) to support the denial of making an
inconsistent statement;
3) to refute the suggestion that the witness’s
memory is flawed due to the passage of time;
4) to refute an allegation of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive
(11-801(D)).



Prior consistent statements may be offered
solely to rehabilitate, and need not be for the
truth of the matter asserted.





Historically, felons could not testify. They
were not deemed “competent.”
So, once they disposed of competency rules,
the rules instead permitted a witness to be
impeached with convictions.

Rationale: A person who has committed a
serious violation of law is generally less
trustworthy than one who hasn’t.
[HARRUMPH!]




Why is a person who committed a felony
necessarily less honest?

(A) In general. The following rules apply
to attacking a witness’s character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal
conviction:

(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction,
was punishable by death or by imprisonment for
more than one (1) year [FELONY GENERALLY], the
evidence:
(a) must be admitted, subject to Rule 11-403
NMRA, in a civil case or in a criminal case in
which the witness is not a defendant, and
(b) must be admitted in a criminal case in which
the witness is a defendant, if the probative value
of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
that defendant [MODIFIED REVERSE 403], and

(2) for any crime regardless of the
punishment, the evidence must be
admitted if the court can readily
determine that establishing the
elements of the crime required
proving — or the witness’s
admitting — a dishonest act or
false statement.

(B) Limit on using the evidence after ten (10) years.
This paragraph applies if more than ten (10) years
have passed since the witness’s conviction or release
from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence
of the conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts
and circumstances, substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect, and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable
written notice of the intent to use it so that the party
has a fair opportunity to contest its use.



Defendant charged with mail fraud and RICO
violations.



Prior convictions:



1978 mail fraud



1981 Medicare fraud





Rule 609(a)(2): Crimes of dishonesty
If something is admissible under 609(a)(2),
does it also have to go through 403?

(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction,
was punishable by death or by imprisonment for
more than one (1) year [FELONY GENERALLY], the
evidence:
(a) must be admitted, subject to Rule 11-403
NMRA, in a civil case or in a criminal case in
which the witness is not a defendant, and
(b) must be admitted in a criminal case in which
the witness is a defendant, if the probative value
of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
that defendant [MODIFIED REVERSE 403], and

(2) for any crime regardless of the
punishment, the evidence must be
admitted if the court can readily
determine that establishing the
elements of the crime required
proving — or the witness’s
admitting — a dishonest act or
false statement.







609(a) was the product of considerable
legislative compromise and there is no
discretion if it is a crime of dishonesty.
The earlier version of “609(a)(2)” originally
had a particularized application of 403 built
into it.
That was rejected and withdrawn.







Congress decided that crimes of dishonesty
can always be used to impeach.
BOTTOM LINE: CRIMES OF DISHONESTY
WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS ARE
AUTOMATICALLY ADMISSIBLE.
RULE 403 does not apply.

